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Research Highlights 
 
We devise a generic game model in the field of cleaner production. 
 
Different game scenarios are generated to reflect the variation of strategic actions. 
 
‘Gambit’ software package integrated with Excel spreadsheet is used for the game 
simulation. 
 
Major factors involved in the game are identified.  
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Abstract 
This paper provides an approach in the field of cleaner production, by showing how 
game theory could be applied to better understand the possible actions of government 
and manufacturers in the context of a ‘game’ to achieve more environmentally friendly 
products. In order to demonstrate the problem situation of cleaner production more 
visually, the ‘Gambit’ software package is used to simulate the created game model 
conceived as a “two person non-cooperative” game. With the improvement of cleaner 
production, different game scenarios have been generated to reflect the variation trend 
of strategic actions. The application of game theory is shown to provide a useful insight 
to inform strategic decision making in both government and manufacturers. In addition, 
the limitation of the game model and the associated analysis has also been discussed, 
which lays a foundation for further work. 
Keywords: Cleaner Production; Decision Making; Game Theory; Game Simulation; 
Gambit Software Package 
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1. Introduction 
An umbrella term for a range of practices aimed at decreasing the impact of modern 
industrial production on the environment, cleaner production has been defined as “the 
continuous application of an integrated, preventive strategy to processes, products and 
services to increase efficiency and reduce risks to humans and the environment” (UNEP, 
2006). Cleaner production strategies can be applied to any point in a product’s life cycle 
in order to mitigate the adverse impact on the environment and human health by 
decreasing the amount or toxicity of raw materials used in the manufacture or packaging 
of a product; redesigning products in order to increase their lifecycle, reusability and 
reparability; reforming the quality of products by which the residual toxicity and waste 
once products entering the post-consuming stage should have been minimized; 
changing the patterns of raw materials demand and consumption that reduce the amount 
and toxicity of waste generated, etc (Tchobanoglous & Kreith, 2002; Allen & Rosselot, 
2004, Reniers & Amyotte, 2012).   
 
Whilst such strategies can bring economic as well as environmental benefits, for 
example via energy savings or reductions in the amount of raw materials purchases, or 
reduction in the costs of waste disposal by reducing the amount and/or toxicity of waste 
for disposal (Smith, Hargroves, & Desha, 2010), there is little dispute that the state has a 
role in setting a policy context conducive to cleaner production. For instance, the 
Chinese government has a stated policy of promoting cleaner production as a route to 
sustainable development, in which subsidies including tax breaks, equipment upgrading 
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etc., are offered to enterprises for the implementation of cleaner production (China 
NDRC, 2006; Dong et al., 2010). As Smith, Hargroves, and Desha also emphasise, a 
range of policy interventions is needed to promote sustainable production. However, the 
policies will have to confront with uncertainties during the implementation of cleaner 
production, due to the conflict of interests between the relevant stakeholders, especially 
between the government and manufacturers (Dong et al., 2010). Furthermore, whilst 
environmental policies are essential to achieve sustainable development, they may not 
be sufficient. Even in the context of the EU, which has put environmental regulations 
firmly on the policy agenda since the 1970s, many manufacturers still primarily focus 
on the profit which is the original bottom line for business (Henriques, 2004), while not 
taking the full lifecycle of products into account, and even do not regard waste materials 
management as a key business area. In addition, studies have been shown that smaller 
organizations pay less attention to “waste prevention” or “cleaner process” than larger 
ones (European Environment Agency, 2003).  
 
In this paper we demonstrate how game theory offers an approach to model the 
behaviour of industrial organizations under different scenarios. We present a simple 
‘cleaner production’ game in which Government and Manufacturers are the principle 
‘actors’. The Government role, is seen as promoting environmental protection to create 
a genuinely sustainable society, whilst safeguarding economic development overall, 
which can be integrated into the concept of the “Triple Bottom Line” (Elkington, 1997). 
TBL provides an interpretation of the concept of ‘sustainability’ that, not only focuses 
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on the economic value, but also on the environmental and social impacts that 
organisations have it in their power to influence (Elkington, 1997; Savitz & Weber, 
2006). For the manufacturers, there are three levels to run a business from bottom to top, 
which can be described as basic market demand, a sustainable source of raw materials 
and energy for production, and ‘green’ societal value for environmental protection 
(Kane, 2010). The traditional basis on which companies operate is governed by the 
profit motive, hence there has been a tendency to neglect their higher moral 
responsibility to provide ‘environmentally sound’ and ‘socially responsible’ products 
having due regard to the Triple Bottom Line (TBL). The manufacturer’s role is to 
promote their individual firm’s economic stability whilst acting in accordance with 
policy and norms of behaviour. Thus, there is a large area of common interest between 
government and manufacturers, which present opportunities and dilemmas to each party 
in the ‘cleaner production’ game. Moreover, game theory will allow a model taking 
account of such actions to be tested more thoroughly, as well as provide an approach to 
determine the possible dominant strategy in the market. 
 
In this paper we first review the existing literature on game theory application to 
industrial production, and then provide a simple and generic game model based upon 
the analysis of the problem situation behind the cleaner production game. Moreover, the 
‘Gambit’ software tool is used to simulate the created game model followed by a 
number of set scenarios, in which government and manufacturers’ actions are 
determined mainly by governmental policy of economic sanction, cost of technological 
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innovation and expected sales profit, whilst fixing governmental subsidy (tax break) as 
a constant. Finally, we offer some conclusions on the potential of game theory as a 
guide to decision makers and suggest further work.  
 
2. Literature review 
Game theory has been widely used as a mathematical and logistical approach applied in 
various research fields, such as economics, marketing, supply chain management, etc. It 
describes the interaction between the ‘players’ who are involved, and as such can be 
seen as an “interactive decision theory” (Aumann, 2003; Pak & Brieva, 2010; Zhao, 
Neighbour, Han, McGuire, & Duetz; 2012). In general, the role of game theory in 
academic research is to help ‘players’ decide their own strategies by predicting the 
actions of other players based on the expectation of the short term maximized payoff 
(despite any unintended consequences in the long term) (Zhao, Neighbour, Han, 
McGuire, & Duetz; 2012). 
 
In the research area of industrial production, game theory has been used for the analysis 
of market structure, product portfolio management, production process planning and 
scheduling, as well as selection for choosing appropriate processing technology (Zhou, 
Jiang, & Huang, 2009; Limaei, 2010; Sadeghi & Zandieh, 2011; Li, Gao, & Li, 2012; 
He, Ding, & Hua, 2012). With the concept of ‘green’ and ‘low-carbon’ technology 
gradually entering into product lifecycle management, as a measure against ‘climate 
change’, studies indicates the traditional production will be upgraded to a more 
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environmental oriented pattern of production, i.e. ‘cleaner production’ (Zhao, Neighbour, 
Deutz, & McGuire, 2012). In this context, game theory provides a useful insight into 
pollution control thus improving environmental performances for cleaner production 
(Jørgensen & Zaccour, 2001; Albiac, Sánchez-Soriano, & Dinar, 2007; Breton, Sokri, & 
Zaccour, 2008; Chew, Tan, Foo, & Chiu, 2009; Dong et al., 2010). For example, Dong 
et al., have built a theoretical framework based on game theory to analyze the conflicts 
between local government and polluting organisation, which also incentivizes cleaner 
technologies in the Chinese electroplating industry. Policy variables including 
‘psychological costs’, ‘environmental benefit evaluation’, ‘reward local government for 
its implementation’ have been discussed in the game model. However, the analysis of 
strategic interaction for industrial production using game theory simulation techniques 
have been rarely reported in the literature, with the exception of those specific to 
production capacity share and product pricing mechanism (Menniti, Pinnarelli, & 
Sorrentino, 2008; Renna & Argonet, 2011). In addition, most of these previous studies 
present game theoretical analysis in an abstract way, based upon mathematical models 
or frameworks, in the form of equations containing many parameters. The messages 
derived from such complex analyses can be poorly understood by decision makers. With 
the development of computer science, computer based game simulation provides a more 
intuitive environment to help decision makers improve their application of theory and 
concepts (Chang, Chen, Yang, & Chao, 2009; Lee & Chen, 2009). 
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This study employs a software package called ‘Gambit’ (McKelvey, McLennan, & 
Turocy, 2007), to visually demonstrate the possible interactions between government 
and manufacturer in the context of a ‘cleaner production’ game. With the ‘Gambit’ tool 
being used for game analysis, the results are easier to apply to aid decision making on 
the development of cleaner production. This application will not only help policy 
makers e.g. government, better understand the dilemma of cleaner production and the 
different interactions resulting from game theoretical analysis, but also aid 
manufacturers identify mitigation strategies to act in accordance with the principles of 
cleaner production. 
 
3. Game model for cleaner production 
At its simplest, a “Two-Person Non-Cooperative” game model is built with two players: 
Government (G) and Manufacturers (M), respectively. A game is defined as 
non-cooperative if there is no pre-play communications or agreements, e.g. the 
strategies selected by players cannot be coordinated within such a game situation (Chew, 
Tan, Foo, & Chiu, 2009; Gale, 2000, p.219). This model starts from the consideration of 
‘fiscal measures’ by Government and ‘cost-benefit analysis’ by manufacturers in the 
process of cleaner production, respectively. Suppose each of them has two available 
strategies. For government, the strategies are: {R, NR} which indicate whether 
government should regulate (R) the manufacturing process and the market competition 
in order to promote cleaner production or not regulate (NR), while keeping the current 
relationship between supply and market demand. Correspondently, there are two 
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strategies for manufacturers, which are {CH, NCH}. Action CH means that the 
manufacturers decide to change (CH) their existing process technology or equipment 
aiming for better product quality and market expansion, whist NCH means no change to 
existing business practices. Table 1 shows the expected payoffs for the two players with 
different actions.  
Insert Table 1 here 
 
In the payoffs matrix, TB corresponds with the governmental subsidy in a form of Tax 
Beak in order to help manufacturers implement cleaner production; P denotes economic 
penalties if manufacturers still insist on environmentally unfriendly production, and C 
represents the cost of technological innovation of manufacturers for cleaner production. 
E denotes the economic benefit that government would gain in terms of revenue when 
manufacturers improve production technology, whilst minimizing environmental impact, 
such as reducing environmental risk and carbon footprint etc. S indicates the additional 
sales that manufacturers may expect from adopting cleaner production instead of the 
existing method of production. I denotes that the possible loss resulting from 
environmental impact (such as pollution events). It is assumed in this study, 
manufacturers cannot predict the actions taken by government at earlier stage of the 
game or before the game is played, however they may pay more attention to the 
potential economic benefits when choosing to change or not to change. Meanwhile, 
government cannot determine whether to regulate the market initially or not, as the 
actions from the manufacturers could change or not change their existing production 
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mode. Thus, their actions are triggered simultaneously, which can be seen as static 
(Geckil & Anderson, 2010).  
 
For any non-cooperative game, the solution is derived from the Nash Equilibrium, by 
which that each player’s chosen strategy is a best response to other player’s strategies 
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991; Gibbons, 1992, p.8). How to find out the Nash Equilibrium 
will be described more detail in the following section.  
 
4. Game simulation 
In this section, a simulation software tool ‘Gambit’ integrated with Excel Spreadsheet is 
used to express the dilemma and possible game actions between government and 
manufacturers. Gambit is an open source free software for game theory simulation, 
through which users are allowed to apply the functions provided for their own 
requirements. In addition, the game solution is encapsulated in a user friendly interface, 
in which the functions can be invoked easily by users to simulate the game situation 
(McKelvey, McLennan, & Turocy, 2007).  
 
According to the above basic game model, the authors here present three possible game 
scenarios in sequence to select different pairs of strategies. These game scenarios are 
generated by inserting different numerical values in terms of a logic unit. Especially, the 
numerical values for each parameter used for Gambit simulation are generated by 
random number function of Excel 2007. The details of the game scenario analysis are 
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described in the following sections.  
 
4.1 Game scenario one 
Game scenario one illustrates the preliminary stage of the game situation, which reflects 
the difficulty in developing a cleaner production program. For government, the 
supervision and regulation of cleaner production is still insufficient with ambiguous 
policies of sanctions and incentives. Furthermore, any new change may also give rise to 
an economic risk for the manufacturer. For instance, if the additional sales of 
environmentally friendly products can not initially cover the total economic cost, 
manufacturers will be reluctant to implement cleaner production. Thus, 
once BS C T P− + < − , manufacturers will prefer paying the penalties for 
environmentally unfriendly production. Selected model parameters for game simulation 
are presented in Table 2. Here, in order for wider application, all the parameters are 
expressed in terms of a logic unit. For example, costs may be indicated as 1 unit to 
represent the real monetary value. The tax break can be provided in terms of ‘Capital 
allowance’, currently around 22% in UK for plant and machinery (UK HM Revenue & 
Customs, 2008), and thus it is suggested in this model 22 percent of the technological 
innovation cost can be saved by upgrading the existing machinery, equipment or tools to 
promote cleaner production. The factor on revenue and additional sales are set as both 
random variables, which are generated by the random function of Excel, 10 to 10000 
times more than the cost. In this scenario, we assume that additional sales can cover 
50% of the cost at most (0.1 to 0.5). Moreover, the fine factor related to economic 
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sanctions needs to be set at a very low level (0 to 0.2), which is estimated by the 
equation BS C T P− + < − , as well as the value range of additional sales factor (S), shown 
in Table 2. Otherwise, if the penalty for manufacturers is set at a higher level, 
manufacturers would mostly opt to change their production process. Thus, the dominant 
strategy pair will be (R, NCH) in this scenario. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Once the model parameters have been determined by Table 2, the Nash Equilibrium is 
stable and will not vary no matter how many times the game model is run. Thus, a 
random group of numerical value from the random number of Excel function has been 
selected to represent the game situation by means of the ‘Gambit’ tool (see Fig.1a). In 
the Gambit tool, the dominated strategies can be eliminated iteratively by the 
dominance panel. The strictly dominated action is opposite to dominant strategy, which 
is defined as “always worse than another, regardless of beliefs at the information set” 
(McKelvey, McLennan, & Turocy, 2010). In this scenario, CH is the strictly weak 
strategy for manufacturers which should be eliminated at first (see Fig.1b). When 
manufacturers determine not to change their current production mode, non-regulation 
becomes the dominated strategy accordingly. Fig.1c shows the second round of 
dominated strategy elimination, in which ‘NR’ has been crossed out. The pair of 
dominant strategy comes out since all the dominated strategies have been eliminated. In 
scenario one, the result in Fig.1d suggests that government should regulate the 
manufacturing process by selecting ‘R’, while the manufacturers’ position remains 
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unchanged (‘NCH’) due to the insufficient economic sanctions.  
Insert Fig.1 here 
 
The remaining strategy pair (R-NCH) represents the unique and stable Nash 
Equilibrium for this game solution. Moreover, this is a pure strategy game, which is a 
game with probability of one given to the selected strategy and zero to others (Romp, 
1997). For instance, Fig.2 shows the computation result of Nash Equilibrium, from 
which the probability equals to one when government chooses ‘R’ and manufacturers 
choose ‘CH’.  
Insert Fig.2 here 
 
The traditional method of computing Nash Equilibrium is strongly deterministic. 
However, the ‘Gambit’ tool provides a novel approach called ‘Quantal Response 
Equilibrium’ (QRE) to search the subset of Nash equilibria. This approach uses 
imperfect or noisy expectations logic instead of the perfectly rational expectations logic, 
when searching for the Nash Equilibrium (McKelyey & Palfrey, 1995). Fig.3 
demonstrates how the ‘QRE’ approach is used to search Nash Equilibrium. As the QRE 
model is a function of probability distribution and the error of choice selection, Lambda 
(λ) in the figure is related to the level of error in expectation. For 0λ = , the actions are 
composed of errors, and for λ → ∞ , there is no error. If both players, government and 
manufacturers, evaluate their expected payoffs in an unbiased way, the probabilities of 
each strategy being selected should be the same at the beginning of the game, that is 
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why all the graphs in Fig.3 start at 0.5. As Lambda tends to infinity (∞), the Nash 
Equilibrium converges to a unique value. For example in this game scenario, the pair of 
Nash Equilibrium is ‘R-NCH’, as well as the probability of selecting both strategic 
actions, equals to one (See Fig.3a and Fig.3d). 
Insert Fig.3 here 
 
4.2 Game scenario two 
Without efficient governmental regulation for industrial production, society could be 
exposed to serious environmental impact. If government imposes heavier economic 
penalties (P) for environmentally unfriendly actions, manufacturers are again obliged to 
compare the payoff in implementing cleaner production (CH), with that of keeping 
existing methods (NCH) in order to identify the most beneficial strategy. Game scenario 
two suggests that if BS C T P− + > − , there is no dominant strategy in the game. Thus, a 
mixed-strategy game scenario will be generated to find out the corresponding Nash 
Equilibrium. A mixed-strategy equilibrium, in contrast to pure strategy equilibrium, can 
be defined as “at least one player involved in the game will place a probability 
distribution for the alternative strategies” (Romp, 1997). However, each player can only 
select one specific strategy in a pure strategy game, e.g. as in the above game scenario 
one. Table 3 reflects the parameters selected for game simulation of the second scenario. 
Suppose that the level of economic penalties (P) for environmentally unfriendly actions 
is now set to severe, i.e. weighted as 10000 times more than cost.  
Insert Table 3 here 
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Fig.4 shows the variation of Nash Equilibria as calculated by the ‘Gambit’ tool, with the 
sales factor being varied from 0.1 to 1. It can be found that the probability that 
government chooses non-regulation (NR) while Manufacturers choose change (CH) is 
nearly 1, about 99%. This pair of strategic selection (NR-CH) approximates closely to 
the dominant strategy selected in game scenario three, which will be demonstrated in 
the following section. Moreover, this selection is strongly determined by governmental 
sanction. Only if the penalty is high enough, will manufacturers consider changing their 
current industrial process by upgrading the existing equipment or technology for cleaner 
production.  
Insert Fig.4 here 
 
4.3 Game scenario three 
With “green consumerism” gaining increasing influence on the market, so well cleaner 
production mature correspondingly, and thus manufacturers will increasingly seek to 
benefit from business opportunities connected with sales of ‘environmentally friendly 
products’. Once the additional sales completely cover the total cost adopting cleaner 
production methods ( S C> ), government will no longer need to take actions to regulate 
the process, manufacturers opting to develop cleaner production voluntarily. This game 
scenario suggests the dominant strategy is that government chooses ‘NR’, and 
manufacturers choose ‘CH’, which is the optimal result among the three game situations. 
Table 4 summarizes the conversion factors to determine the model parameters. 
Insert Table 4 here 
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As long as ‘additional sales’ (S) is above cost (C), ‘NR-CH’ (Non-regulation for 
Government, Change for Manufacturers) is the unique Nash Equilibrium of this game 
scenario no matter how the factors change. Fig.5 shows the possible maximum and 
minimum payoffs of strategies of ‘R-CH’ and ‘NR-CH’ with both revenue and sales 
factors being varied from 10 to 10000.  
Insert Fig.5 here 
 
As long as the equality S C>  is satisfied,
 
the Nash Equilibrium will not be changed in 
this scenario. Fig.6 shows a random group of numerical values being selected to 
simulate the game situation by Gambit tool (assuming 10 for both revenue and sales 
factors in this example). Like the analysis of game scenario one, the dominated strategy 
and its corresponding payoff should be eliminated. Thus, Figure 6.b shows no matter 
government choose regulation or non-regulation, ‘NCH’ is the weak strategy for 
manufacturers which should be eliminated at first. When the action of ‘NCH’ has been 
eliminated in the first round, ‘R’ is the dominated strategy for government in the second 
turn whilst ‘CH’ is selected by manufacturers (see Fig.6c). Once all the dominated 
strategies have been eliminated, Fig.6d suggests that the dominant strategy is that ‘NR’ 
selected by government and ‘CH’ by manufacturers. This result also suggests a pure 
strategy pair with the probability of one being calculated for both strategy ‘NR’ and 
‘CH’, respectively (see Fig.7).  
Insert Fig.6 here 
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As an analogy to the first game scenario, ‘QRE’ approach can be also applied to this 
scenario in order to search the unique Nash equilibrium. Fig.7 reflects that the strategic 
action pair ‘NR-CH’ is the unique and stable solution of Nash Equilibrium found by the 
‘Gambit’ tool.  
Insert Fig.7 here 
 
In contrast, the ‘QRE’ curves shown in Fig.8, which present the steady trend of rising or 
declining probability, have fluctuated at first and then stabilized. For example, when 
government chooses the action of ‘R’, the probability firstly ascends from 0.5 to above 
0.6 and then regresses, finally falling down to 0 (See Fig.8a). This phenomenon results 
from the principle of maximum benefits followed by different actions of Government, 
‘R’ and ‘NR’ respectively. From the payoff matrix in the game scenario three, it can be 
seen from Fig.6 that government can gain the maximum benefit while choosing ‘R’ to 
the extent of 3321.95 logic unit. That is why the probability of ‘R’ has shown an upward 
tendency from 0.5 to 0.6 in Fig.8a. However, when taking the possible actions of 
manufacturers into account, e.g. ‘CH’ being selected, the individual rational behaviour 
reminds government to re-consider the payoffs. By contrast, government can gain more 
benefit as 0.25 logic unit followed by selecting ‘NR’. Thus, the probability to choose 
‘R’ has fallen back to 0.5, and then gradually reduced to 0.  
Insert Fig.8 here 
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4.4 Analysis of game interaction 
According to the above game simulation, it is concluded that the strategic actions that 
government and manufacturers will take mainly resulted from the following factors, 
economic penalty (P), technological innovation cost (C) and additional sales (S). Fig.9 
illustrates the interaction between influencing factors and the strategic actions.  
Insert Fig.9 here 
 
It is clear that the economic penalty (P) set by governmental policy needs to be high 
enough to compel manufacturers to change their current production mode actively, thus 
to implement cleaner production as well as provide ‘environmentally friendly’ products. 
The technological innovation cost (C) should be in accordance with the basic standards 
or principles of cleaner production, to ensure that new products are associated with 
reduced environmental risk and carbon footprint, and are sustainable. For food and 
those materials with which people will have direct contact, the criteria of production 
should be much stricter. The potential economic benefit on the part of manufacturers is 
determined by the additional sales profit (S), which will also give rise to increasing 
governmental revenue. Moreover, the profit accruing from additional sales is strongly 
determined by consumer behaviour, and attitudes to ‘environmentally sound products’, 
public acceptance, automatically determining the actions of manufacturers, i.e., whether 
to ‘Change’ or ‘Not change’.  
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5. Conclusion and further study 
Game Theory offers an effective approach to formulating a dominant strategy designed 
to improve performance across the three dimensions of the Triple Bottom Line 
(Economic, Society and Environment). This study has applied game theory to better 
understand the dilemmas that can exist between government and manufacturers, as well 
as provide insightful perspectives on the potential problems in the context of cleaner 
production. With the model parameters being assigned different numerical values in 
terms of a logic unit, three game scenarios have been developed sequentially which 
reflect the possible changes in the actions of government and manufacturers that could 
accompany the implementation of cleaner production. The game model mainly depends 
upon the variation of the following three important factors, such as innovation cost (C), 
economic penalty (P) and additional sales of ‘environmentally friendly products’ (S). 
Although government will seek to regulate the process in the initial stage of cleaner 
production, due to insufficient penalties, as well as any possible change giving rise to 
additional economic risk for manufacturers, i.e. additional sales cannot cover the 
innovation cost, the result in game scenario one suggests the dominant strategy is that 
government chooses regulation (R) while manufacturers do not change (NCH) the 
existing production mode (‘R-NCH’). With further development of cleaner production, 
it is assumed in game scenario two that government attaches more and more importance 
to efficiency of regulation and supervision, and thus the penalties have been increased 
accordingly. The game has been evolved as a two person mix-strategy game without any 
dominant strategy. However, as long as the penalties are set high enough, manufacturers 
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should opt to change their production technology to be more ‘green’, and government 
will gradually adjust the regulatory policy. Once cleaner production has been 
implemented and the ‘environmentally sound products’ have become the mainstream of 
market, government no longer needs to intervene strongly, because manufacturers are 
then willing to promote cleaner production to gain increased profits, additional sales 
covering the total of technological innovation, equipment upgrading etc. Thus, the 
dominant strategy ultimately becomes non-regulation for government and change for 
manufacturers (‘NR-CH’). This approach using game theory assists decision making, 
and informs government and manufacturers on how to promote cleaner production.  
 
However, there are still some limitations involved in the game model and simulation. 
First of all, the manufacturers are considered one entity, regardless of the scale, quantity 
and quality of productions, economic benefit and selected strategies, etc. Secondly, in 
order to simplify the analysis of game simulation, the factor of tax break has been fixed, 
and consequently the selection of strategic choice will be influenced. Moreover, the 
interactions between the different organisations, enterprises and customers have been 
omitted. Further study will focus on the underlying mathematical modelling for the 
game representing the complexity between government, manufacturers and other 
stakeholders, as well as the development of game simulation in different scenarios. 
Moreover, it is expected the game model can be fully quantified for further application 
by means of integration with case studies.  
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Table 1  
Payoffs matrix between Government (G) and Manufacturers (M) 
M 
G CH NCH 
R E-TB,  TB-C+S P-I,  -P 
NR E,  -C+S -I,  0 
 
 
Table 2 
Model parameters of game scenario one 
Parameters Conversion factors Note 
Cost (C) 1 unit 
Tax Break (TB) Cost×22% 
Economic Benefit (E) Cost×Rand×Revenue factor  
Additional Sales (S) Cost×Rand×Sales factor 
Economic Sanction 
(P) Cost×Rand×Fine factor 
Environmental Loss 
(I) Cost×Rand×Loss factor 
 
Rand is a function 
which the random 
number from 0 to 1 will 
be selected. 
 Revenue factor is 
between 10 to 10000 
Sales factor is between 
0.1 to 0.5 
Fine factor is between 0 
to 0.2 
Environmental loss 
factor is 10000 
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Table 3 
Model parameters of game scenario two 
Parameters Conversion factors Note 
Cost (C) 1 unit 
Tax Break (TB) Cost×22% 
Economic Benefit (E) Cost×Rand×Revenue factor  
Additional Sales (S) Cost×Rand×Sales factor 
Economic Sanction 
(P) 
Cost×Rand×Fine 
factor 
Environmental Loss 
(I) 
Cost×Rand×Loss 
factor 
 
Rand is a function 
which the random 
number from 0 to 1 will 
be selected. 
 Revenue factor is 
between 10 to 10000 
Sales factor is between 
0.1 to 1 
Fine factor is 10000 
Environmental loss 
factor is 10000 
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Table 4 
Model parameters of game scenario three 
Parameters Conversion factors Note 
Cost (C) 1 unit 
Tax Break (TB) Cost×22% 
Economic Benefit (E) Cost×Rand×Revenue factor  
Additional Sales (S) Cost×(1+Rand×Sales factor) 
Economic Sanction 
(P) 
Cost×Rand×Fine 
factor 
Environmental Loss 
(I) 
Cost×Rand×Loss 
factor 
 
Rand is a function 
which the random 
number from 0 to 1 will 
be selected. 
 Revenue factor is 
between 10 to 10000 
Sales factor is between 
10 to 10000 
Fine factor is 10000 
Environmental loss 
factor is 10000 
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Figure Captions 
 
Fig.1. Gambit simulation for game scenario one 
 
Fig.2. Computation result of Nash Equilibrium in game scenario one 
 
Fig.3. Quantal response equilibrium approach for game scenario one 
 
Fig.4. Nash equlibria of game scenario two 
 
Fig.5. Maximum and minimum payoffs with different factors 
 
Fig.6. Gambit simulation for game scenario three 
 
Fig.7. Computation result of Nash Equilibrium in game scenario three 
 
Fig.8. Quantal response equilibrium approach for game scenario three 
 
Fig.9. Influencing factors and strategic action 
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Fig.1. Gambit simulation for game scenario one 
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Fig.2. Computation result of Nash Equilibrium in game scenario one 
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Fig.3. Quantal response equilibrium approach for game scenario one 
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Fig.4. Nash equlibria of game scenario two 
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Fig.5. Maximum and minimum payoffs with different factors 
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Fig.6. Gambit simulation for game scenario three 
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Fig.7. Computation result of Nash Equilibrium in game scenario three 
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Fig.8. Quantal response equilibrium approach for game scenario three 
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Fig.9. Influencing factors and strategic action 
 
 
Additional Sales of New 
Products (S) 
Basic Standards of 
Cleaner Production 
Governmental Policy 
Action Choice of 
Manufacturers 
 Action Choice of 
Government 
Economic Penalty (P) 
Technological 
Innovation Cost (C) 
Economic Benefit 
Tax break  
